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UNIFIED SOC INCIDENT RESPONSE BLUEPRINT

Plex2Shell: How to Detect & Patch Plex Media Server RCE

Hackers actively exploit the Plex2Shell 4-flaw vulnerability chain to deploy Linux proxy backdoors and Monero miners on Plex servers. Here is how to patch.

Detection & Hunting Detectors (1)

[T1190] Plex2Shell Hunt QueryStandalone Rule
// Query 1: Detect Suspicious Process Execution Spawned by Plex Media Server
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("Plex Media Server", "Plex Transcoder", "Plex Media Server.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "curl", "wget", "myawesomeproxy", "mylovelyminer", "xmrig", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceId,
    DeviceName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    FileName,
    ProcessCommandLine,
    AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

// Query 2: Hunt for Network Connections to Plex2Shell Ingress & C2 Infrastructure
let c2_ips = dynamic(["217.60.194.116", "91.92.40.202", "176.65.139.228", "45.194.92.222"]);
let c2_domains = dynamic(["ota.proxystream.st", "global.relay.proxystream.st"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (c2_ips) or RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    DeviceId,
    DeviceName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName,
    RemoteIP,
    RemotePort,
    RemoteUrl
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Verified Indicators of Compromise (8)

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
8 Identified
DOMAINglobal.relay.proxystream.st
DOMAINota.proxystream.st
IPV4176.65.139.228
IPV491.92.40.202
IPV445.194.92.222
IPV4217.60.194.116
PROCESS NAMEmyawesomeproxy
PROCESS NAMEmylovelyminer