Lab Verified: 2026-10-19
Plex2Shell Hunt Query
The attack chain stitches unauthenticated SSRF (CVE-2026-96652) and plugin parameter injection (CVE-2026-96654) to steal admin owner tokens, followed by transcoder SSRF (CVE-2026-96655) and codec path traversal (CVE-2026-96656) to execute native ELF binaries.
// Query 1: Detect Suspicious Process Execution Spawned by Plex Media Server
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("Plex Media Server", "Plex Transcoder", "Plex Media Server.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "curl", "wget", "myawesomeproxy", "mylovelyminer", "xmrig", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
| project
TimeGenerated,
DeviceId,
DeviceName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
FileName,
ProcessCommandLine,
AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Query 2: Hunt for Network Connections to Plex2Shell Ingress & C2 Infrastructure
let c2_ips = dynamic(["217.60.194.116", "91.92.40.202", "176.65.139.228", "45.194.92.222"]);
let c2_domains = dynamic(["ota.proxystream.st", "global.relay.proxystream.st"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (c2_ips) or RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains)
| project
TimeGenerated,
DeviceId,
DeviceName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
RemoteIP,
RemotePort,
RemoteUrl
| order by TimeGenerated descNeed to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEventsDeviceNetworkEvents
Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.
False Positives & Tuning Guidance
Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.
Source Incident Analysis
Plex2Shell: How to Detect & Patch Plex Media Server RCE
Disclosed: 2026-10-19
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK
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