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UNIFIED SOC INCIDENT RESPONSE BLUEPRINT

ccTLD DNS Hijacks: How to Detect & Block Rogue TLS Certificates

Hackers compromise .GH, .SL, and .AS registries to hijack Google domains and issue rogue TLS certificates. Discover CT log hunting and CAA hardening rules.

Detection & Hunting Detectors (1)

[T1195.002] ccTLD DNS Hijacks Hunt QueryStandalone Rule
index=* sourcetype IN ("stream:dns", "pan:dns", "bro:dns", "suricata:dns")
| where match(query, ".(gh|sl|as)$")
| stats count values(query) as queried_domains values(answer) as resolved_ips by src_ip, query_type
| eval alert_type="ccTLD Regional Query Anomaly"
| where count > 1
| sort - count

Verified Indicators of Compromise (5)

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
5 Identified
BROWSER MITIGATIONGoogle Chrome CRLSets
COMPROMISED CCTLD.as (American Samoa)
COMPROMISED CCTLD.gh (Ghana)
COMPROMISED CCTLD.sl (Sierra Leone)
DNS CHALLENGE PREFIX_acme-challenge.*