UNIFIED SOC INCIDENT RESPONSE BLUEPRINT
ccTLD DNS Hijacks: How to Detect & Block Rogue TLS Certificates
Hackers compromise .GH, .SL, and .AS registries to hijack Google domains and issue rogue TLS certificates. Discover CT log hunting and CAA hardening rules.
Detection & Hunting Detectors (1)
[T1195.002] ccTLD DNS Hijacks Hunt QueryStandalone Rule
index=* sourcetype IN ("stream:dns", "pan:dns", "bro:dns", "suricata:dns")
| where match(query, ".(gh|sl|as)$")
| stats count values(query) as queried_domains values(answer) as resolved_ips by src_ip, query_type
| eval alert_type="ccTLD Regional Query Anomaly"
| where count > 1
| sort - countVerified Indicators of Compromise (5)
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
5 Identified
BROWSER MITIGATION
Google Chrome CRLSetsCOMPROMISED CCTLD
.as (American Samoa)COMPROMISED CCTLD
.gh (Ghana)COMPROMISED CCTLD
.sl (Sierra Leone)DNS CHALLENGE PREFIX
_acme-challenge.*