Lab Verified: 2026-10-08
ccTLD DNS Hijacks Hunt Query
The compromise bypassed enterprise perimeters, exploiting authoritative DNS control to satisfy automated ACME dns-01 Domain Control Validation (DCV) checks with public Certificate Authorities.
index=* sourcetype IN ("stream:dns", "pan:dns", "bro:dns", "suricata:dns")
| where match(query, ".(gh|sl|as)$")
| stats count values(query) as queried_domains values(answer) as resolved_ips by src_ip, query_type
| eval alert_type="ccTLD Regional Query Anomaly"
| where count > 1
| sort - countNeed to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents
Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.
False Positives & Tuning Guidance
Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.
Source Incident Analysis
ccTLD DNS Hijacks: How to Detect & Block Rogue TLS Certificates
Disclosed: 2026-10-08
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK
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