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CVE-2026-61500 Hunt Query

Root cause stems from generating session-cookie signing keys with JavaScript's non-cryptographic Math.random(), enabling state recovery from unauthenticated SRP handshakes.

// Hunt for abnormal child process execution originating from Rejetto HFS binary or Node instance
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("hfs.exe", "node.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "hfs" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("hfs", "rejetto")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "curl.exe", "certutil.exe", "whoami.exe", "sh", "bash")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

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False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

CVE-2026-61500: How to Detect & Patch Rejetto HFS RCE Flaw

Disclosed: 2026-10-05

Read Attack Chain
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