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AI Agents Steal 600K Cards in Mass E-Commerce Skimmer Attack Hunt Query

The campaign chained automated scanning with LLM orchestration (Claude Opus 4.6), injecting JavaScript skimmers via poisoned S3 buckets, CDNs, and Kubernetes pods.

// Microsoft Sentinel / Defender Hunting Query: Detect Tampered E-Commerce Checkout Scripts and S3 Bucket Modifications
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath has_any ("/var/www/html", "/pub/static", "/app/code", "/checkout")
| where FileName endswith ".js" or FileName endswith ".php"
| where ActionType in~ ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python3", "python", "sh", "bash", "php", "node")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceFileEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

AI Agents Steal 600K Cards in Mass E-Commerce Skimmer Attack

Disclosed: 2026-09-23

Read Attack Chain
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