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TeamFiltration Attacks Breach Microsoft 365 Cloud Accounts Hunt Query

Operators compromised unmanaged functional service accounts provisioned with default passwords and zero multi-factor authentication (MFA).

// Microsoft Sentinel / Defender Hunting Query: Detect Anomalous Cloud Sign-ins on Unmanaged Service Accounts Followed by Fast VPN Shift
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where UserPrincipalName has_any ("svc", "service", "admin", "backup", "scan", "printer", "functional")
| where ResultType == 0 // Successful sign-in
| extend ClientIP = IPAddress, Country = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, ClientIP, Country, UserAgent, AuthenticationRequirement
| summarize Count = count(), Countries = make_set(Country), IPs = make_set(ClientIP) by UserPrincipalName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where array_length(Countries) > 1 or array_length(IPs) > 2
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
SigninLogs

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

TeamFiltration Attacks Breach Microsoft 365 Cloud Accounts

Disclosed: 2026-09-24

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