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TA419 Hunt Query

Attackers establish conversational trust by impersonating former White House OSTP officials, then deploy customized Frameless Browser-in-the-Browser AiTM proxies to harvest credentials and session tokens.

// Hunt for anomalous token usage with IP address discrepancies indicative of AiTM session hijacking
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where ResultType == 0
| where AppDisplayName in~ ("Office 365 Exchange Online", "Microsoft Office 365 Portal", "SharePoint Online")
| extend DeviceDetail_Browser = tostring(DeviceDetail.browser)
| extend DeviceDetail_TrustType = tostring(DeviceDetail.trustType)
| summarize IPCount = dcount(IPAddress), IPList = make_set(IPAddress), Locations = make_set(Location) by UserPrincipalName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where IPCount > 1
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPCount, IPList, Locations
| order by IPCount desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
SigninLogs

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

TA419: How to Detect & Block Chinese AiTM Phishing Attacks

Disclosed: 2026-10-06

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