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Lab Verified: 2026-11-14

FaceStealer Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Account takeover of trusted contacts combined with prerecorded stolen victim webcam footage, generative AI deepfakes, and ClickFix lures.

// Hunt for processes initiated from clipboard or browser execution following connections to lookalike meeting domains
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "firefox.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "bash.exe", "sh.exe", "python.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("IEX", "DownloadString", "curl", "wget", "base64", "-enc", "http")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

FaceStealer: How to Detect DPRK $400M Fake Video Call Attacks

Disclosed: 2026-11-14

Read Attack Chain
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