Lab Verified: 2026-10-22
LiteLLM Hunt Query
The malicious build embeds 'cook.pth' to auto-execute the 'privcollect' credential stealer on Python startup, harvesting AI API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic), cloud tokens, and proxy configs while running a background dead-drop backdoor.
// Query 1: Hunt for Network Connections to Exfiltration Endpoint
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has "litellm.dev/healthcheck" or RemoteUrl has "letters9813"
| project
TimeGenerated,
DeviceId,
DeviceName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
RemoteIP,
RemoteUrl
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Query 2: Hunt for File Creation of cook.pth in Site-Packages
DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName =~ "cook.pth" or FileName =~ "cook.py"
| project
TimeGenerated,
DeviceId,
DeviceName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
FolderPath,
FileName
| order by TimeGenerated descNeed to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceNetworkEventsDeviceFileEvents
Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.
False Positives & Tuning Guidance
Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.
Source Incident Analysis
LiteLLM: How to Detect & Remove cook.pth Supply Chain Backdoor
Disclosed: 2026-10-22
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK
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