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Hardening CI/CD Pipelines Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Static automation secrets, non-ephemeral runners, poisoned build caches, and lack of artifact provenance attestation.

// Hunt for CI/CD runners initiating outbound network connections to non-allowlisted IP addresses
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("Runner.Worker", "gitlab-runner", "jenkins-agent", "actions-runner")
| where RemotePort in (80, 443, 8080, 22)
| where not(RemoteUrl has_any (".github.com", ".gitlab.com", ".npmjs.org", ".pypi.org", ".pkg.dev", ".docker.io"))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl
| sort by ConnectionCount desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceNetworkEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

Hardening CI/CD Pipelines: Google's Software Supply Chain Guide

Disclosed: 2026-09-26

Read Attack Chain
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