Skip to main content
Lab Verified: 2026-11-14

GSocket Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Exploitation of web applications followed by staging GSocket in memory-backed paths (/dev/shm) using shared secrets to evade IP blocks.

// Microsoft Defender for Endpoint - Hunt for GSocket execution and network relay staging
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where FileName has_any ("gs-netcat", "gsocket") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("gsocket.io", "gs-netcat", "gsnetcat")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
Need to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Open SOC Defanger Workbench
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

GSocket: How to Detect Stealthy Linux C2 Relay Malware

Disclosed: 2026-11-14

Read Attack Chain
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK

Have tuning recommendations, encounter false positives in your environment, or want to contribute rule improvements?

Submit Feedback →