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Lab Verified: 2026-10-30

Adobe Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Command injection in Adobe Campaign Classic, authentication bypasses in Veeam Backup & Replication, and Junos OS routing daemon defects.

// Hunt for unexpected shell or reconnaissance tool executions spawned from backup or enterprise daemons
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("Veeam.Backup.Service.exe", "Veeam.Backup.Manager.exe", "nlserver.exe", "httpd.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "whoami.exe", "nltest.exe", "vssadmin.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

Adobe: How to Patch Critical RCE Vulnerabilities

Disclosed: 2026-10-30

Read Attack Chain
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