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Lab Verified: 2026-10-18

ConnectWise Hunt Query

The attack vector weaponized multi-tenant OAuth application credentials, allowing threat actors to request app-only Entra ID access tokens that bypassed user MFA and passwords to access Exchange, Teams, SharePoint, and Microsoft Graph APIs.

// Query 1: Hunt for Service Principal Sign-Ins from Adversary C2 IP
let maliciousIP = "144.172.64.128";
let compromisedAppIDs = dynamic([
    "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae",
    "2399d300-6fca-4e6a-a686-399fefe75b83",
    "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640",
    "b78f6a77-d4e5-46fb-87e5-d1648bd02519",
    "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827",
    "412dcf96-176d-4b3a-a1b0-4981ad66971e",
    "b2b55f5b-7758-4719-8d8f-88ae172e6bdb"
]);
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-13 00:00:00Z)
| where IPAddress == maliciousIP or AppId in (compromisedAppIDs)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    IPAddress,
    AppId,
    ServicePrincipalName,
    ServicePrincipalId,
    ResourceDisplayName,
    ResultType,
    ResultDescription,
    LocationDetails
| order by TimeGenerated desc

// Query 2: Correlate Sign-ins with Credential Additions in Entra AuditLogs
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-13 00:00:00Z)
| where OperationName in ("Add service principal credentials", "Add application credentials", "Add member to role")
| extend InitiatingApp = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName),
         InitiatingIP = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId),
         TargetApp = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    OperationName,
    InitiatingApp,
    InitiatingIP,
    TargetApp,
    Result,
    AdditionalDetails
| order by TimeGenerated desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

ConnectWise: How to Detect & Remediate M365 Tenant Hijacking

Disclosed: 2026-10-18

Read Attack Chain
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