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Lab Verified: 2026-11-14

SignDrop Zero-Day Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Flawed container signing logic in clfs.sys coerced via Windows Defender's signature update RPC to execute arbitrary file creation as System.

// Hunt for suspicious .cnpf file creation events originating from MsMpEng or non-system processes
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName endswith ".cnpf" or FileName endswith ".blf"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "MsMpEng.exe" or InitiatingProcessAccountName != "SYSTEM"
| where not(FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath, FileName
| order by Timestamp desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceFileEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

SignDrop Zero-Day: How to Detect Windows CLFS Root Exploit

Disclosed: 2026-11-14

Read Attack Chain
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