[T1078] Valid AccountsCRITICAL
Lab Verified: 2026-11-14
SignDrop Zero-Day Hunt Query
Root cause vector: Flawed container signing logic in clfs.sys coerced via Windows Defender's signature update RPC to execute arbitrary file creation as System.
// Hunt for suspicious .cnpf file creation events originating from MsMpEng or non-system processes
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName endswith ".cnpf" or FileName endswith ".blf"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "MsMpEng.exe" or InitiatingProcessAccountName != "SYSTEM"
| where not(FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath, FileName
| order by Timestamp descNeed to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceFileEvents
Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.
False Positives & Tuning Guidance
Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.
Source Incident Analysis
SignDrop Zero-Day: How to Detect Windows CLFS Root Exploit
Disclosed: 2026-11-14
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK
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