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Lab Verified: 2026-11-14

Cursor Breach Hunt Query

Root cause vector: Stolen Fireworks AI credentials exposed unredacted API tokens from 2025 AI agent telemetry logs, enabling cache injection into the Cursor marketplace.

// Microsoft Defender for Endpoint / Sentinel Hunting Query
// Identifies Cursor IDE and child processes modifying SSH configuration or establishing unexpected outbound SSH sessions
let IdeProcesses = dynamic(["cursor.exe", "code.exe", "node.exe"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-10-29T00:00:00Z)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (IdeProcesses)
| where FolderPath has ".ssh" and FileName =~ "authorized_keys"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, AccountName
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where RemotePort in (22, 2222)
    | project DeviceName, NetworkConnectionTime=Timestamp, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl
) on DeviceName
| order by Timestamp desc
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceNetworkEventsDeviceFileEvents

Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.

False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.

Source Incident Analysis

Cursor Breach: How Hackers Poisoned Claude Code Extension

Disclosed: 2026-11-14

Read Attack Chain
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