[T1059.001] PowerShell ScriptingCRITICAL
Lab Verified: 2026-10-29
NIK C2 Hunt Query
Root cause vector: Dual-channel C2 over TLS WebSockets and HTTP polling with automated in-session AI analysis of harvested keystrokes and credentials.
// Hunt for rogue csrss.exe instances and fodhelper UAC elevation artifacts
let RogueCsrss = DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "csrss.exe" and not(FolderPath startswith @"C:WindowsSystem32")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let UacHijack = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey has @"Classesms-settingsShellOpencommand"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName;
RogueCsrss
| union UacHijack
| order by TimeGenerated descNeed to defang indicators or test triage logs?
Use our zero-telemetry client-side parser to extract, defang & format indicators.
Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEventsDeviceRegistryEvents
Ensure telemetry connector is actively ingesting this table into your Sentinel workspace or Defender XDR.
False Positives & Tuning Guidance
Legitimate administrative software deployment scripts, authorized security testing, or system maintenance tasks.
Source Incident Analysis
NIK C2: How to Detect & Block AI-Driven Ransomware C2
Disclosed: 2026-10-29
DETECTION_ENGINEERING_FEEDBACK
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