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Lab Verified: 2026-11-16

Rundll32 7z.dll Side-Loading & CoffeeLoader Execution

Retadup worm resurfaces using re-registered C2 domains and USB propagation to deliver CoffeeLoader via 7z.dll DLL side-loading. Hunt with Sigma and KQL.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "7z.dll"
| where not(ProcessCommandLine has_any(@"C:\Program Files\7-Zip\", @"C:\Program Files (x86)\7-Zip\"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
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Target Log Sources & Tables
DeviceProcessEvents

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False Positives & Tuning Guidance

Custom administrative deployment scripts running portable 7-Zip from temp paths.

Source Incident Analysis

Retadup Worm: How to Detect & Block Resurfaced CoffeeLoader

Disclosed: 2026-11-16

Read Attack Chain
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