Telegram Widgets: How to Detect & Block WebRAT Infiltration

SOC Briefing Summary :: Executive Key Takeaways
- [01]Vulnerabilities in Telegram's newly launched web widgets permit client-side sandbox escape and remote code execution.
- [02]Kaspersky warned of active in-the-wild exploitation delivering the Rust-based WebRAT (Salat Stealer) via silent PowerShell commands.
- [03]WebRAT extracts Telegram session credentials (tdata), browser cryptocurrency wallets, and grants persistent remote administrative access.
Executive Incident Briefing (2-Minute CISO Brief)
Quick Answer (At-A-Glance): Kaspersky issued an urgent security warning regarding active, in-the-wild exploitation targeting Telegram's newly launched interactive web widgets. Security researchers previously demonstrated Remote Code Execution (RCE) through the feature, and telemetry now indicates threat actors are exploiting the underlying webview sandbox vulnerability to trigger background PowerShell commands that deploy WebRAT (Salat Stealer). Written in Rust, WebRAT hijacks the infected host, steals Telegram desktop session files (tdata), extracts cryptocurrency wallet private keys, and enables lateral network propagation. Security teams should immediately block the execution of child processes fromTelegram.exeand deploy endpoint Sigma and KQL detections.
On November 10, Telegram CEO Pavel Durov publicly promoted the platform's new interactive web widgets feature, asserting that "any message on the platform can now become an app." Within 24 hours, security researchers at V12 published proof-of-concept videos demonstrating remote execution of local desktop applications (such as calc.exe) simply through bot widget interactions. Days later, Kaspersky confirmed that threat actors had operationalized the vulnerability in the wild.
- Target Platform: Telegram Desktop and Mobile Client Widget / Mini-App Webview Interfaces
- Vulnerability Mechanism: Client-side webview sandbox escape and inter-process communication (IPC) command injection.
- Delivered Payload: WebRAT (also known as Salat Stealer), a multi-functional Rust-based Trojan and credential harvester.
- Primary Targets: Corporate Telegram accounts, executive communications, cryptocurrency wallets, and internal enterprise networks.
Because Telegram Desktop is widely deployed across enterprise technical, software development, and cryptocurrency organizations, an unauthenticated zero-click or single-click RCE creates severe enterprise exposure.
Technical Vulnerability Analysis & Attack Chain

Telegram's widget architecture permits rich HTML5/JavaScript interactive applications to run directly inside an embedded webview frame within the messaging client.
1. Webview Sandbox Escape & IPC Injection
The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation in the bridge connecting the embedded webview to Telegram Desktop's native C++ runtime. By crafting an interactive widget with malformed URI handlers or manipulating JavaScript object prototypes exposed by the Telegram API bridge, an adversary escapes the webview sandbox.
This permits the web application to execute system commands outside the browser context, effectively treating the user's local operating system permissions as its own.
2. Silent PowerShell Execution & WebRAT Staging
In observed wild attacks, visiting a malicious channel or opening a weaponized widget message caused Telegram.exe to spawn powershell.exe silently in the background with hidden window attributes (-WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass).
The PowerShell script executes an in-memory download cradle that retrieves an executable payload from remote C2 infrastructure. The binary dropped onto the target machine is WebRAT (Salat Stealer), compiled in Rust to resist static reverse engineering and signature detection.
3. Forensic Harvesting & Telegram tdata Theft
Once executed, WebRAT focuses heavily on messaging and financial assets:
- Telegram Session Hijacking: Recursively copies and archives
%APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdatadirectory contents, allowing attackers to clone the victim's Telegram session onto foreign devices without triggering SMS or app-based 2FA prompts. - Cryptocurrency Theft: Searches browser extensions and filesystem directories for private key stores associated with MetaMask, Phantom, Exodus, and Binance.
- Browser Credential Extraction: Dumps DPAPI-encrypted passwords, tokens, and cookies from Google Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge.
4. Lateral Network Enumeration
Following credential extraction, WebRAT opens persistent reverse shell connections to adversary infrastructure and executes system discovery commands (whoami /all, net view, ipconfig /all) to identify adjacent corporate domain controllers and shared network resources.
MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Operational Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1204.001 | Malicious Link | Luring victims to interactive Telegram widget channels and messages. |
| Execution | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Webview sandbox escape allowing native command execution from messaging client. |
| Execution | T1059.001 | PowerShell | Spawning hidden PowerShell processes to download and stage WebRAT. |
| Credential Access | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | Stealing Telegram tdata session folders and browser cryptocurrency wallets. |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote Services | Reusing stolen credentials and Telegram accounts to distribute malware laterally. |
Detection, Hunting & SOC Mitigation Playbook
1. Immediate Containment Checklist
- [ ] Enterprise Policy: Advise corporate users not to launch third-party Telegram widgets or interactive mini-apps until a certified security update is released.
- [ ] Enforce Endpoint Security Rules blocking
Telegram.exefrom spawning child script engines (powershell.exe,cmd.exe,wscript.exe,cscript.exe). - [ ] Terminate active Telegram Desktop sessions on any endpoint showing suspicious
tdatafolder reads by external processes. - [ ] Block outbound network connections to identified WebRAT command-and-control IP addresses and drop domains.
2. Behavioral Detection Strategy
- Alert on any process creation event where the parent process is
Telegram.exeand the child process is an administrative script interpreter. - Monitor file access events targeting the
%APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdatafolder by non-Telegram processes. - Hunt for unexpected Rust-compiled binaries executing from
%TEMP%or%LOCALAPPDATA%.
3. Endpoint Detection & Hunting Query
Sigma Detection Rule
title: Telegram Desktop Spawning Command Interpreter (WebRAT Delivery)
id: 1c2b3a4d-5e6f-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects Telegram Desktop spawning script shells such as PowerShell or cmd, indicative of widget RCE and WebRAT delivery.
author: Rutvij Khatri (CyberNewsAI)
references:
- https://www.securityweek.com/telegram-widgets-hit-by-rce-demos-malware-warning-days-after-launch/?ref=cybernewsai.com
date: 2026-11-16
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Telegram.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None known in standard enterprise deployments.
level: critical
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190Microsoft Sentinel / Defender Detection KQL (Telegram Process Anomaly)
// Detection Query: Hunt for Telegram.exe spawning command line interpreters
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "Telegram.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| sort by Timestamp descMicrosoft Sentinel / Defender Lateral Movement & Threat Hunting KQL (Telegram Session Theft & Network Recon)
// Lateral Movement / Threat Hunting: Track processes accessing Telegram tdata followed by internal network sweeps
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FolderPath has @"Telegram Desktop data"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "Telegram.exe")
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("net.exe", "net1.exe", "arp.exe", "nltest.exe", "ping.exe")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("view", "/all", "domain_trusts", "group")
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc4. Enterprise Hardening & Long-Term Resilience
- Attack Surface Reduction (ASR): Enable Microsoft Defender ASR rule
Block executable content from email client and webmailandBlock child process creation from office and communication applications. - AppLocker Restrictions: Block script interpreters from executing with parameters passed from user-space messaging clients.
- MFA Enforced Password Resets: Require cloud-based 2FA passwords on all enterprise Telegram accounts to limit the utility of stolen
tdatasession tokens.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Indicator Type | Value | Forensic Description |
|---|---|---|
| file_path | %APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdata | Telegram Desktop session storage directory targeted for credential theft |
| other | WebRAT / Salat Stealer (Rust-based RAT) | Primary malware family deployed via widget exploitation |
| other | Telegram interactive message widgets & mini-app webview | Vulnerable application component abused for sandbox escape |
---
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%APPDATA%\Telegram Desktop\tdataWebRAT / Salat Stealer (Rust-based RAT)Telegram interactive message widgets & mini-app webview// VERIFIED_SOURCES_&_REFERENCES
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